l ee ee a et ne eR 2 UO ME i i aie a : 2 ia a, : cot 7 aatiiier i 9 b, S$ i Bor ee es Py gin OP ee arene COLLECTIONS Te eG [dos 116M1 os oe ie Oe oe eee pp 4A | ae (Pe ' ht a ‘DEPARTMENT OF STATE a | i MAS HINGTON a ; [ b 1 | b J Pe ae _ MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT | Subject: Viet-Nam Fy This memdrandum ‘has been discussed with Bob. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Thompson ¥ | and has been revised to reflect their suggestions, ae ‘[Except for thé major difference in. positions. set. 6. © . 3 forth on page 10_/ it can be taken as representing. :° °°... ° the generally agreed views of all four of-us. . The memorandum consists of two major parts. Part I is a discussion of the probable risks inherent: in a program of gradually mounting military pressure on the North. In spite of these risks, we are in general agreement on this. program, ry We have taken account. of these risks in connec~ tion with the military actions already taken. -As we’ move-~step by step--up the: scale of military action, | ~ you will certainly wish to appraise the level of risk at each point--although admittedly your ability to oo, . ' @ontrol.exposure to risk is likely to diminish as the ' scale and intensity of military pressure increases. i i i qt | 4 i ca on ape e Soe. Part Lf of the memorandum is a program of poli - tical action. Such a program is an essential accom- ! paniment to the military program, It is needed for Pee ig Ce ; Several reasons: : ; wn ed eee ‘ : 2 : ; grit A ane To make , , ‘ + ne te em ote Ja re Ciel a whe Dect ga fei rad git He eh ke - eae ere Td fee tag iy nae 8 grt Fw at ds Spat " 7 wenn rgetens Ao sgt an 08, - TOP SECRET sal . + . / ke a. To jaan’ ‘elear to the world that our ORS OG rs _ tives are ‘peace. and freedoms. , ae b Lb. To minimize: the danger of MIG engagement: . and Chinese and Soviet. involvement, giving the Soviets | an alternative to BURPORE of Chinese: mibitancy s ee. | To preempt a probable peace offensive by the Communists; ‘°°. ° aoe “S d. To enable. ‘you. to eee for a political: settle= ment at any point where you determine that ‘the risks. of further military pressure have become prohibitive in the Light of our over~all. interests. PART I cae RISKS OF OUR MILITARY PROGRAM | A. Nature and objectives of the Proposed Military | Program ' The course of action. we are now proposing. to follow (subject to. refinement by exchangés with - Saigon and further staff work here) envisages _ continued « air attacks, on a joint United States/South Vietnamese “Basis, against. military targets directly related to ‘North Vietnamese infiltration. It. also contemplates attacks on targets such as railroad lines, in response -to Viet Cong attacks on. corresponding targets in the’ South, ‘ We would continue to justify such air strikes as responses’ to Viet Cong action in the South, Viet Cong. attacks on United States personnel and installations would call for practically automatic response. Other “Viet Cong activities would be assessed continuously, | and the criteria for. response left as flexible as possible, Since we TOP SECRET. wn pete enrte eanmeneermmerereet a wetelewes ay : 7 Ss a fant geomet at b . wpe st ay o + a! +a Teese tbe mere § : eae ES oo we ane “ithaca ASiRactiaseat ar ? . v ren rennet res i oe ‘ aie ta v3 < | 7 . mee enera Ve 7] i ne "a t 30. ze ry aes t A eh bs 5 Ty Z an md t " o % Px os i ced as a | : a at . es . ae ree ans isnegesy sna eats S- 2 * Bt tay %. Sn oe E . Py Sa 28 se * atl : So yesggei st at BAS gk wa “ « oe we teat wr vee <7 janepetrity te. ny Ae * veep tn tc a a CO cae TOR SECRET 3. Since we would seek to justify ou attacks as xesponses to Viet Cong actions we might: not. be able fully. to control their.tempo, However, we would seek to keep as much flexibility. as. possible. oe We envisage that - the attacks would slowly increase. in-scale. We: propose to mount strikes at roughly weekly . intervals unieee our hand is forced by dramatic VG - actions. The fundamental objective of this program is: to. increase United States bargaining power, vis~-a~vis Hanoi and Peiping, to the point where a satisfactory political solution becomes possible, Hopefully these attacks. should also tend to improve morale and increase . stability in Saigon while impairing the infiltration efforts of the North Vietnamese, Be Risks of War with Sumiciet Caras: Ll. We cannot long continue air strikes against . North Viet-Nam without facing, the likelihood of engage ment with the 53 Chinese MIGs sent to Hanoi to defend North Viet-Nam, | The danger of encountering these MIGs will increase as we strike targets closer and. loser to Hanoi, Tn our air strikes: to dees we have hit targets: up to sixty miles north of the 17th parallel, At some point--if we close the remaining gap of 250 miles to Hanoi~-engagement by United States planes with the 53 MIGs sent to Hanoi will become inevitable. We xecommend delaying the chances of MIG involvement by continuing for. the next eight weeks to confine our strikes to targets below the e 19th parallel, Such’ targets lie outside the effective” range.of the ground — control center of the Hanoi-Haiphong eompLlex,. 2. Once TOP SECRET em ‘v pete Natl eden, we SSE ype) ake ese mae awe ow cee ee memory pes ape i rm TR f i: : .. , q FE? a ea ee ‘. . ¢ rng ah ot ae, sy ed iis cA Gn ec ompant ns. ‘ate , nt 3? : ond E => wee rea tee 1 » "ge ‘Om ae: DRV ground. force move South. The DRV can support an ground, air and naval forces. . ‘assist in defending North Viet-Nam against the United TOP SECRET nity \ 2. Once our planes have been engaged heavily by MIG aircraft, you will be compelled-~in order to. prevent unacceptable losses--to face the decision to mount an — air effort to eliminate the major MIG base at Phuc Yen, = near Hanoi. This base is. heavily defended. Some . _ parts of the base. are near populated areas. . Any effective. strike against it would require a massive air effort. . 2a, If we hit targets in or approaching the Hanoim Haiphong area, it will ‘be likely at some’ point to. trigger invasion of 125,000 troops (20-50,000 through. the DMZ; balance through Laos). There is-no. current: estimate of what US response would be needed to stop this action. . It would clearly require substantial increases of US 3, Last November, the United States intelligence . community unanimously agreed that, if the United States attacked above the 19th parallel, "Chinese Communist aircraft, operating from Chinese bases would probably States attacks".* Perhaps the involvement by Chinese air would first take the form of “volunteers,” but it might: shortly be followed by direct engagement: of | Chinese. planes operating from the sanctuary of Chinese territory. There are now approximately 35() Chinese © jet fighters deployed in the Hainan area of South China--within striking distance of North Viet-Nam. 4. Once Chinese aircraft entered the conflict you — would be under considerable pressure to order United States Forces to knock out offending Chinese bases-~and even to’ strike at Chinese nuclear production installations. 5. TLE Chinese air bases were hit, some of our intelligence experts believe it likely that: China would move massive ground forces into North Viet~Nam, and subsequently into Laos, South Viet~Nam, and possibly Thailand. Other experts assess the chances as being lower. All agree that such a movement would be entirely possible. 6. Ie * The Feb. 11 estimate is that this "might" occur. “toP SECRET t i ; . H a ~~ 4 - Tee fore eee 7 1 mre rr or fo eee 3 . + Ty . a oe . Eran rereraes : anicd nick ieptaes: 1s meneame ce neenn ee gest t ernereeernancenenenentstnanney me a eeeetne Bee ust eeetsie eee ie * me mineanuen ne ate 6 pene ema tcnntpe we ne ae eee acer eet a aaa ee < r eta ome ate eae ee ae oh 4 *. Fink a a Romer PR iets te a PO ta Ne Tyee ee ee le hae I wD ete Pa A A en ye ast eons 2. POLE IB Foe eaten Moe Ted a Qiend Pt atte em teat y eye FS WEN * : ' aad oa é woe ip ate ae ect fo Sig eo ee ee Ba ' , So ee tt Rl conpemeronier reece recta OS i et 8 i He a Re eters ne ecb i Sa eee aoe ee ee ee Pit as ; we ey eer Rarer: oe Poel ay Wb oy pet spe enaaiags ont co ; as 5 qo ~~ ae ae eee ree armor TOP SECRET on 2 - Fos 6. If Chinese ground forces were to move into Southeast Asia, we would be compelled to make a major effort to stop thei, The only way that this could be done through conventional.means would be by intro~ . ducing substantial United States ground combat forces into South Viet-Nam. The magnitude af the required. -effort would almost certainly mean that you would. have to call up reserves, 7, It is estimated that the Chinese have the ' logistical capacity to support 14 Chinese divisions . and 8 North Vietnamese divisions in a movement into Laos, Thailand and South Viet-Nam (without taking ~ account of United States and Allied interdiction operations). In. order to counter this movement, we would be required to bring in 5 to.8 United States divisions with a total troop strength (including sup~ porting. elements) of 300,000 :-men, ~ 8, The confrontation of Chinese ground forces by American ground forces would induce debate in the United States as the need to use nuclear weapons~= although DOD does not believe there would be a military requirement for such- weapons, Recalling the’ Korean experience, some Ameritans would argue that United — States ground forces should not be asked to fight. large numbers of Ghinese troops without resort to nuclear weapons, in which the United States has a ' clear advantage. - 9, To use nuclear weapons against the Chinese would obviously raise the most profound political problems, Not only would their use generate probably irresistible pressures for a major Soviet. involvement, but the United States would be vulnerable to the. charge that it was willing to use nuclear weapons against non-whites only. 10,. Peiping's. TOP SECRET Pe : wile 2 tee eM ‘ ; ' sos sag, , ae laa oe sD ge hae . Bays 3 ne af, : rs “Seance o ‘ we Pe a “% ee Ss ¥° Popes pence is rae oe a “Fry —e-FT sew ee aye . $ ! ae eres ot Bf tis goal . sae TOR RE mapas: (ait way ~ ; fe a ee | if . . ca 7 Ps peace Po Y, i . . Sys nyges we A . et Wee ay oes Pree 7 sn gt yy one Ne as ta fe Meet Peay adie eet erent tn gH YON ends te a Sh te ten yet al tea, RCI der eehaatt ee es Gl nats See RO ane Hhcs as ae ee F Loe ore ohn wer, a ee _ A : . pt Pa aay a? ar a an SEE ee a ene ener rare neat tat char - : | p 10. Peiping's decision whether or not to inter- vene may well turn upon its estimate of the extent to - which it can expect. Soviet support, Unless we provide the Soviets with a political alternative they can a ‘support they will.be in a weak position to bring pressure on the Chinese Communists to move toward a settlement. Without such a political option they will ‘also find difficulty in resisting Chinese pressure to. provide assistance in the event of a United States- Chinese military conflict, Sucha political option is suggested.in Part II of this paper. aed C, ‘Chances of Conflict with the USSR We. cannot. be certain at this time what the Soviets - will do if we continue our air strikes against North ‘Viet-Nam--particularly if these strikes lead to-direct . conflict with the Chinese, The Soviets may want the Chinese and us to bloody our noses, but we doubt they . would be in position to exploit this desire, In the jast analysis, the Soviet stake is the. leadership of the Communist Bloc, Gompetition for that leadership would probably.force the USSR in the direction of , increasing its.aid and involvement, On balance, we think it highly likely that--if the war should continue and escalate~~the Soviets would feel compelled to extend an increasing amount of assistance to the North, Vietnamese: and Chinese, 1. Kosygin's trip has already resulted.in a commitment by the Soviets to give increased defense assistance tc Hanoi. We do not know what form this increase will take. The United States Intelligence “Community thinks "the chances are about even" that ‘ground-air missiles~-probably with Soviet missile. cxrews~-will be included, The likelihood of increased aid commitments will grow as our raids extend northward to Hanoi, 2, If we FT vee gh ee! aera , a Fe New ogy ae te ' was = fags oh ieee Stace cae tage aye nr er rere Sarre re reenter 7 a. UN ites Mees took eg ee et ¢ oes eal: oe ar a emery *] as r Ea “HT4 7 PPT EY Py ore ee seas 3 . vs . e ¥ ? ‘ io 5] ae. ” eye oc mae aaa ie apne o, “ee fs . n> eb nes aise Te ios § 8 awe 8 ee Seven ee a CC os 7 oF Reade, s Fume oe ae a : meee men anit he we: ti a BH As. bs ed ec TOP SECRET AUF OUR. a ” a he Ys - F : : : , / , . 2, I£ we should become engaged directly with the . Chinese, the Soviets would be faced with a painful ‘dilemma. Under the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty ‘(which is fifteen years ‘old on February 14) the Soviets . are obligated to come to China's assistance if China “4s attacked, The Soviet Union could avoid this com- mitment only by claiming that China's actions had caused the attack, Under existing circumstances, .~ this would be tantamount to denouncing the treaty. 3, Since China is rich in manpower, the Soviets would probably seek to limit their contribution to advanced military equipment, But, again, the contri- ‘bution of Soviet missile and other personnel or volunteers could not be excluded, A, “Soviet harassment of United States inteyests . elsewhere might well be another step in this sequence . .o£f events, Ambassador Kohler pointed out on Thursday that'",,,the Soviets may be intrigued with possibilities inherent /in the7/ somewhat:less than enthusiastic. support of our policy in Southeast Asia by [the 77/_ _ majority /o£77 Western European countries and may think that by presenting them.with /a77 nasty flareup in central Europe and exerting pressure on us to temper actions in Viet-Nam, they have /a7/ real opportunity of causing serious intra-alliance friction," “ 5, At the very least, progress toward improvement of United States~Soviet relations would be severely set back, Moreover, we could look forward to a substantial deterioration in the evolution of the Bloc toward a reduction of tensions and the development of a system more compatible with that.of the West. C, Negotiating Pressures and World Reactions 1,. In many major capitals there are already Signs of deep concern at the present state of the conflict and the dangers of escalation, U Thant, the French, and India Jie aden pepe newman nse en are Sew eects etme sere gt oe ewe te pees wees neem 0 aie a naetewerere nensnt pete ——— . ot we, Nae ~ os Wee TA Newt rae ~ ae oe TENT EE I a TIT omen moments einer anny po ener ne ne areata cetera App A A ARR a ' ver ng ame fa geet a wp eh gt . oe : a aby i * ‘6 . - fe ae. ‘ Fy ee RT ape prs ot. hg ae , g es an) pt atte m~ 7 : 4 te et Pat tee, “gone a 2. " : Fat fet yee ri pole hs ries * tat epi on e . . ¥ * 8 ma . oe a ’ ‘ oe oa En ee ee neonon te nS man flallwrn mainte sua tudo | TOP SECRET Re and India have already called for some form of negotiation, The British have advised us that they are under public. ‘pressure to take a negotiating inmitiative.. Labor =~ back~benchers can. be expected to increase this pressire with any rise in the intensity of military operations, The: Canadians have also told us that they are considat- ing proposals that would lead to negotiation, although both they and the Indians do not ‘propose an immediate — conference, : a abe. i as; . , 2, More sagore lio: Ambassador Stevenson has “reported. that there is substantial sentiment in. the: United Nations favoring negotiation, This conte, con» . ceivably lead to negotiating initiatives, 3. Any egeetacicnssaved the repetition o£ aix | ‘stxikes at. the present level of intensity~-will. increase : these pressures, If we found ourselves engaged with the MiGs. and particularly if we were compelled to strike’ Phuc Yen, the Soviets, Indians, Candians, British, and others would almost certainly bring strong pressure for immediate negotiations., Many: would call for'an immediate conference with no pre- conditions-=before | we had built up sufficient bargaining: power, _ , - 4, Up to this point, we have the. public support ” of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Taiwan, South - - Korea, and the Philippines. We have,. at least, the . understanding and acceptance of the governments. of the United Kingdom, Canada, and our NATO allies generally~- except for France, On the other hand, we must recognize that even such an ally as Japan has expressed its strong opposition to any systematic program of air strikes against the North. 5. Even the continuance of military pressure against North Viet-Nam at the present level would pro- bably arouse sharp. hostility among the Afro-Asian nations, TOP SECRET TU ay tree i | a, TOG OS EE SO a EE TE x “ © es rr a OE rsa nas remtanetenitiene ah Seats, Bese TESy Alen exnusie. was! evar neceetebaaneh's, At eaters ineBaoettag Ook sens Senet igs eee ae a neg ie thas eth z ogre? ET = ra Sie a TRIE iene: TAR tele e ae Ee Ee its aaa mi aie baa a oe le a Bt | a i Mace eee uals a ae 3 yr": 2 7 1 ! TOP SECRET ; ras Z 1 ' ; , int an ; Broce: nations, Indonesia. would be of particular concern, - Hog _ since by stepping up its actions against Malaysia it i could create a two~front conflict, Thea. general g attitudes of Afro~Asian and neutralist nations need not be a serious drawback in themselves, . but they would contribute to an over-all world atmosphere highly. critical of our position., | Se x ia TF - vig Y° $ Sage af BS gs mea, ora, + ye is Ty TOP SECRET pet teen nme renee eit aR REH ogc rod Ne ; ears Mead Bee roe, as 3 eal te Nes sapere ne ‘| . : A eS Tan aha alee SN Sea sree Sredbemectier ine tated een real” 5s: wvsek eo EL RI AAT Bn Rho CN Bites taste enninmenca shoes ihe bei Ted SRO FLL at ANE MEE Noe Facth ieih Set Hf bestia tee ae a aia oe aor “ ~10~: PART iL OUTLINE OF A POLITICAL PROGRAM Ae Our Objectives in South Viet-Nam eee a pana, hee from Ball and Poeun: as to-what the United States should realistically | expect.to ‘achieve in South Viet-Nam.and the degree of risk we should assume. McNamara>Buncy Position *. ‘ McMamaza and Biaaiay believe that we must pursue | a course of increasing military pressure to the’ ‘point where Hanoi is prepared to agree not. only to stop infiltration from the North, put. effectively to call off the insurgency in the South and withdraw those: elements, infiltrated in the past, To achieve this. ebjective, they would accept the risks of. substantial escalation, including the acceptance of ground warfare with Red: China~~although they believe it likely that we can achieve the desired objective without such a. war. This view is shared by Maxwell Taylor, Ball-Thompson Position Ball and Thompson believe that--short of a crushing military defeat~--Hanoi would never abandon the aggres= sive course it has pursued at great cost for ten years and give up all the progress it has made in the - . Communization of South Viet~-Nam, © For North Viet~-Nam to call off the insurgency in South Viet-Nam, close the botder, and withdraw the elements it has infil- trated into that country would mean that it had accepted unconditional surrender, Ball TOP SECRET fatale anata tanrereany , 3 } gs — 7 om eaten aaRRPCORREREIEE URAREEPECT wei eS Ee CE ie ” es tebe doce : Pa ea eae i ae ant p eoare: she ts. See vs areca «Bae sath Arie gS d aaa te oT cane softer : nog + oe ae. EE Bae * fae ogee een Nema ete Wie Geer a OE - a Sree atninihid Teese wena en wy ee. Se EN ER Lt 0 Eas Rati temerecertanedted ITS = So path de 5 etcies setts suchen eds bik estate RL NE FN ne etree nan iarl diate Sie elt poi 3 iS eee Sr RS tee ae (CIMT erence mmenenaneimntst anaes tetetepue tren ente peg aero titer tt tRNA ROR ANAS PS ARTS he TOG eg St ne Wg Te 2 8A mE " 2 te . . oy Po oom es z e . . TOR SECRET ~ Tdm Ball. and Thompson believe that Red China would be extremely reluctant to permit Hanoi to suffer’. such unconditional surrender since it would mean | the collapse of the basic Chinese ideological posi- tion which they have been disputing with the Soviets, | Peiping would thus be under great pressure to engage - - the United States on ‘the ground as well as in the Ball and Thompson believe that the Chinese decision to intervene on the ground would, in the final analysis, probably depend largely on the extent ‘to which Peiping felt assured of Soviet support. There is no way that we can safely predict whether ‘or not such support would be forthcoming, They are convinced, however, that the risks of Chinese ground intervention would be great and the costs of such intervention tremendous~-particularly since. the very taking of this step by Peiping would presumably imply. substantial Soviet involvement, perhaps even to the. | point of a large«scale Soviet-US confrontation, os ‘Ball and Thompson have supported the air strikes that have so far _faken-place-and they.would support ar G e e . a program of gradually increasing military pressure, They believe that only in this way can’ the United States achieve a bargaining position that can make possible an international arrangement that will avoid a humiliating defeat’ to the United States, They do not believe, however, that'we can realistically hope for-an international arrangement that will effectively stop the insurrection in South Viet-Nam and deliver the entire country south of the Seventeenth Parallel to the government in Saigon free and clear of insurgency. They consider that the most we can realistically expect from any international arrangement are measures to stop TOP SECRET f ' + - + “Fy q i aaemes tf " a de oe ween eee Seon sos sath S apes ate eae ee ® Toe weeny ee ERSTE YP FT 2. ae “hr cy" Sesh pot } ne a abet eee Ge gheont (oeey = ™ oe Cay i eee + ome ees NS by . ' 2 . ~ 2D ” . * et a a Re SR eS oy Say reese Dae voted Sauk. te eg eS onapimene hme y ~ f “s t a. ‘ sae, ee ee Ves Si. a, Oran 3 1 i | { F . spp Date os en rae F Ee ae te! ae “ew ' fide a) a ne aa ¥. oe Sa at “eet TOP SECRET “lla stop ‘the infiltration so that we may be able, over time, to reduce our commit mnitments. Hopefully the military, actions preceding such an arrangement would have created a sufficient sense of unity in Saigon to make it possible for the South Vietnamese Government<-. with diminishing United States help--to clean up an insurgency that had become mandeceets by the shutting of the borders. ; In all events, Ball and. Thompson recommend that you must be prepared and alerted+-whenever it. appears that military conflict may have reached the level of intensity where Chinese ground intervention ;seems likely--to accept a ceasefire under international auspices short of the achievement BF pur total political objectives. B. . Elements . ° TOP SECRET Neha hind wins ‘ < + aetna eee ees an TT rT rete meer eerctena gy ep moee ere oo tah opeet rn meemanenenreremnres semttey ttt Yer 24 ¥ a * ‘ . ar ot Ed Rese er oh wy Laie hie aia oe . ses oe an ”, aoe Ph. Severino lke oy al! a0 Mam tet sean @ mate Ee —reelmee tery tne enna nent mene Reet on ne ee ee te ETE ee ON A IRE etry TEE BO te age ee ea 0, A RG BO gap wer mma ty perm tee te Ret See Os fe ae TOP SECRET Gt Des Be ELoments of a Political Program ‘The political program ‘ we propose consists of four parts: - : (a) The issuance of a joint US~ South Viet~ ‘Nam ~ statement of aims; (b) Based on this we otedent: the sabia ston: of the South Vietnamese problem to the, Security Council and full discussion in the Security Council of all aspects of that problem; i (c) Negotiation of the conditions for a confer ence to be conducted among a group of countries. con-~ sisting of the United States, Great Britain, France, South Viet~-Nam, North Viet-Nam, Red China and the Soviet Union; and " (da) Negotiations at the conference. (a) Issuance r. an. howe US- South Viet- Nam Statement. of Ai Aims. sec enenneen an teen I} 5 nates: ad SHO "Oo eee ee pe SEE bg Et qv & a yy “hues Ideally,. the United States and South Viet-Nam. stould jointly issue a statement of war aims as a é ee eT OO Gas aa Tae Uive ata ry =: “3s Fae Ms pe ' ' Cas %, te ©) ch) verses i eee ie ” . “ bh ah v7 “lant 2 ete OL, 4 a3 ag “wt ae ay sit a we “aes oe 1 Aha avait 4 t - ? prelude to the submission of the South Vietnamese case to the Security Council. Because of the action of U Thant in issuing a statement of his own, we may find it necessary for the President to outline our objectives to the world over the weekead, without “waiting for full South Vietnamese concurrence. A joint US~South Vietnamese, statenent af. aims would include these elements: ‘1, The two governments intend to continue to take all necessary military measures to stop the Communist Tor SECRET 4 * Sige yore der ot ae Piha Nae a ‘ we Gaeta: ory fav! meas oa 4 Ste aft te < oa b> 8 De rer reer arent Te eee tee repos —y*- t ? J OS late ., tte een nite epee oe een Sy ae ee moreno My fone er meray tne nee meng aa * *. "Ws : rr a agen oO, EO ae “IS, owes ermal Be oe te ot inn ds erste esta optim ooo ky pee ae ee ae ons TOP | SECRET = 2e Communist aggression against the Republic of South. Viet-Nam, : 2. Our joint and sole aim is- to secure and main-" | tain the political independence and tervitorial integrity [ of South Viet-Nam so as to permit it to develop its - institutions and live in peace with its neighbors free . from outside interference, arc The pen andenee OF South VietNam requires the. cessation of the guerrilla activities in South .. Viet~Nam directed and supplied from the North, the stopping of iffiltration from the. North, and the withdrawal of Viet Cong cadres previously infiltrated - into South Viet-Nam, 4, South Vietnamese aaunenaaices which is, the: birthright of every nation, large and small, should be internationally guaranteed, 5. Such a guarantee must be reinforced on the | ground by peace-keeping machinery with enough strength and a sufficient mandate to assure that all Parnes: to ADE, Borers abide by their promises, © 6, This machinery can best be established anes the aegis of the United Nations. . 7. Once these arrangements are carried out, the. United States: is prepared to withdraw its military forces from South Viet-Nam. /It must, of course, be made clear that any final arrangement should include. the . right of South Viet-Nam to call in assistance ata moment's notice if the United Nations’ guarantee should prove inadequate, (b) Submission _to Security Council As soon as possible-~and we do not think that this can be delayed at the most for more than a week~-the_ United TOP SECRET © a 2 vs wtede My Neen teeta Torre ee Baas e £ 2 . v4 a me yct ¢ = Sy ei ve By ene mite enereenpane: ia z : : , 1 ee 2 ‘ ee aed Gee 5 aig : q "fe “Tr Se eetammme Crateaet wes el af - rs : a iS id < 4 SF Alt: eo ba h., * . - 4 : re APY ® Te? TEER? 7 4 we OS Pa cae at te ee 4 rt ¢ sy 2 t Mea J ae 3% baa ‘ TOP SECRET — arent : f $ ‘ aon | “whee a = United States should bring the Viet-Nam issue to the ; United Nations Security Council. Conditions at the | moment are propitious since the Security Council has iA the most favorable composition in years--the five. - ‘permanent members, plus Bolivia, Urugeay, the _nconpectare ee et | Netherlands, Malaysia, Jordan and the Ivory Coast. : , aa ok pa | = a | . . 1. In proceedings in the Security Council, the F ‘ United States would: . - 4 P { . 4 ie (i) Present all available evidence to } 4 establish that the insurrection in South Viet-Nam. i is not an indigenous revolt but an insurgency ae , imposed, directed, supplied, and inspired ‘from ee ee: oe 7 North Viet~Nam. [The effective establishment -— _ oe = tae | , FS of this proposition may require some compromise | a { ma” oa of existing intelligence. We should be prepared: Bi : : to do this,/ : (ii) Call for the establislumient of peace We Ra. > R “dn South Viet-Nam under conditions that will ae ks assure its independence. ‘These include the ae iz halting of infiltration and the stopping of the. = - direction and encouragement of the revolt from. ee | : the North, , c | f ie | cA -(iti) Call for a meeting with representa~ F | i tives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, ri France, USSR, Communist China, North Viet-Nam E | , and South Viet-Nam to discuss arrangements for 5 4 a ceasefire, the cessation of infiltration, i | and the establishment of peace in South Viet-Nam. - i” | ~ - (iv) Suggest that the Hanoi regime as well - t : as the Republic of Viet~Nam be iavited to join | Bi in the deliberations of the Council. ‘ , ; bre ed ae | Et a a | ey | i Qo | TOP SECRET, : | | dele 372 Ue, Tat representa go peter ae a man A NET 8 oe re pet te. ou © ’ . aa Sra “ wus oe ener t a ye get a” ele ao 2Gte. San pt tela uae . “pte rs, Ay rte Oo of " vo ot tay at hod e. oe . - er earner sy tek cay ge . Gy etait A ere” ’ . 5 ° E ree ae re eee ? eBay Meg poe Pemy iF a8) wee MA Sarat yt oe a neers weds Far Moy Boos | sae : 3 at Se ". canes wie . ey Es aise ASA OOD Nt DORIS Bi coN ara gestions wie ned wea eetuy Abi ie siane Pas avetteetle Sagu hataahie' sas. gb. 8k tne Some Sg : ee TOP SECRET. Ry: , | IF | . ere. , 2, It is unlikely that Hanoi would send repre- sentatives to New. York, Most probably both. Hanoi and Eee | ° Peiping would scornfully reject the Security. Council A ee ee proceedings~-at ‘least in the first instance. “But taking the problem to the Security Council and calling ¢ “€ for peace negotiations--while stepping up cur military a oo efforts and our military buildup--would increase the a F pressure on the Soviets to help put an end to the crisis by joining in a call for a ceasefire and a conference, 4 , iter wv ZB Ty i ee ee eee ee (c) Preparatory Meeting of the Six Countries | The proposed preparatory meeting would provide .. the forum for really serious negotiations, By debating the conditions under which a conference might be called--while: at the same time continuing cur military activity--we might be able to push the other nations in -the direction of cur objective. i. the “8. Bgl ‘; Bo ot Saas tees ae 2 | (ad) The Conference ‘ : Setar care ter - . on | If we should ever get to. a Geneva-type conference. “ERs, aif : : : 2 tye we would presumably have concluded most of the bargain- fag ing in the earlier proceedings. . The conference could, | ne however, be the mechanism for arranging for UN guarantees . sue and a UN presence. Moreover, it would probably be aos desirable to include a Laos settlement in. such a an conference as well, bine “eg 77a Need _to Preempt Security Council Initiative Be We must be aware that the Soviets may take the “Let 7 ats initiative to bring us into the Security Council as. the fs defendant rather than the prosecutor. Moreover, the re pressure on the Secretary General to call the Security or | Council into session under Article 99 of the Charter co will also increase; so far, he is restrained from , ete sent, acting by his own caution and our negative advice. : We canmot negotiate a settlement of this issue in ae 4, | a, ‘ paver | ) the Security E ' ; y ; eT ? TOR SECRET * : . }. Ce eee rn rr re ee ee eer ase re” tial Bee ir Y Bee atte ee tae ; : ¢ ' xk aac tas Sie i on, c , wn . eae UG Fe ceied Pa a Me a TE, ee) 2 doa ye! OK tonal Se ee SA oe | Te ON Ey we ta Be Re Ge tinge nee TD OM BP be TY tet eh pe a arte PNRM eae ayy af sate cb gm piece eee me ere poms ore nape nna tino nie mantener timewamhonitnemniecen Ser 646,24, Saas elem : ‘ f ee ic ach essa pens Reine tee om pom arcana tere Sorter terme re 14 Wr net esa wa tet ET Me tne ee et ce were y TOP SECRET Stee 7 the Wadueieg Council, because Hanes and Peking would not be willing to do it there. But we can start the process there, and thereby secure the political initiative in our own hands. sadaee: Aertel é Acting Secretary TOP SECRET at a, - Sy es oa pines ae TIE HITE 7 SaaS Se saat 5 Sag gsr ag “Te 7 “ A ney ae rte ernest tne et en aren tertrarrremerrentn rend i 4 ‘ Yate a of aaNet si Pr yt tot tis eae vey epee: ey Terre Vera eT “"g ot orenipt. “TI